Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War

Although very cautious, Johnston’s psychological critique still leaves room for discussion. Based on David E. Bell’s research, he argues that ‘[A]fter series of disappointments actors will revise their expectations in more pessimistic directions. Thus, one should see more conflictual (though perhaps more stable) relations with interlocutors over time.’23 David E. Bell’s article researches the psychology of consumers when selecting prod- ucts.24 Whereas research on bubble football consumer psychology is about relations among economic interests, Sino–US relations cover the three areas of economics, politics and security. From 1990 to 2011, Sino–US economic relations were obviously much better than Sino–US political or security relations. Deterioration in Sino–US ties over that time were mainly the result of pol- itical or security issues, and economic interests helped to enhance relations between the two countries during this period. Moreover, the key assumption in research on consumer psychology—that actors seek to maximize bene- fits—differs from what happens in Sino–US relations, where interlocutors look at both absolute and relative benefits. For example, although the United States desperately needs to increase employment, the US government nevertheless continues to restrict Chinese investment in the United States to prevent China from controlling United States’ strategic economic sectors. This is a classic example of a policy targeting relative benefits. Hu Jintao requested at the 2011 APEC summit in Hawaii that Obama ease political restrictions on Chinese investment, but there was no progress on the matter.25 Using consumer psychology to analyze bubble football uk the diplomatic policy of states is thus problematic. Johnston admits: ‘Of course, exuberance, disap- pointment, and shattered expectations are characteristics of the psychology of people and small groups, not nations or states.’26

Johnston further argues: ‘Mere dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to proactive, conflictual, responses. Rather, disappointment often results in passivity, based on a feeling of helplessness, rather than a more aggressive or angry response.’27 He also notes: ‘[P]eople are more likely to concede to another side if that other side expresses disappointment rather than no emo- tion at all.’28 It would seem, though, that his point of view perfectly illus- trates that a superficial friend can opt not to cooperate, or to protest in order to express dissatisfaction, the difference between non-cooperation and pro- test being that each causes different extents of deterioration in relations. When one party expresses dissatisfaction, this implies that bilateral ties  have deteriorated. If his interlocutor makes a concession, the negative im- pacts are short-lived, and relations go through a short cycle of deterioration followed by rapprochement. The impacts of such a disturbance are thus relatively limited. If, on the other hand, the interlocutor does not make a concession, the deterioration of relations might be more permanent. By the time one party recognizes that a policy of confrontation will not result in concessions and adopts a strategy of superficial friendship to improve ties, the other party will respond with a superficial friendship strategy, so achiev- ing enhancement of relations. The resultantly lengthy cycle of deterioration– improvement in relations, however, generally leads to a serious disruption of ties. This explains why levels of instability between superficial friends tend to vary so much over time.

For any given issue,   bubble football buy  the degree of influence superficial friendship has on the policies of the two parties will vary depending largely on how much impact the issue has on the respective parties’ interests. The party that bene- fits more or loses least is always more proactive in adopting a superficial friendship strategy to improve relations than the party that benefits less or loses more. For example, when in 1999 the US Army bombed the PRC Embassy in Belgrade, China demanded a formal apology from the United States. Because the US government was unwilling to offer a formal apology, the bilateral relations between the two states seriously deteriorated. As China was the victim in this case, we can assess the sincerity of the US apology based on the extent to which it was formal. The United States, which caused the harm, was naturally not willing to make a formal apology, and did not regard as important whether or not the apology was formal. A bi-national public opinion survey asking: ‘If the United States had adopted another means of handling the bombing of the Zorb football Embassy, would China’s reaction have been more moderate and kept Sino–US relations from suffer- ing so much damage?’ showed that 86% of US respondents believed China’s reaction would not have been more moderate, while 57% of Chinese re- spondents believed that it would have.29 Generally speaking, the party that is not injured or that benefits will proactively adopt a superficial friend- ship strategy to improve relations, while the injured party, or the one that feels disappointed, will respond with a superficial friendship strategy after its interlocutor has proactively made improvements. (Figure 1)